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In Oct. 5, 
and v. NORTH-
COMPANY Corporation), Cross-
; NORWICH UNION FIRE 
INSURANCE SOCIETY Corporation), Appellant; 
S'l'. PAUL l\LEJROUllY INDE:M:NI'l'Y OOJVIPANY (a 
ment of 
et Cross-defendants and Respondents. 
Contract- Formation: Premiums- Payment.--
notified an insurance agent from 
liability policy that it was going 
which it did, but the agent, 
had the insurer issue a new policy 
refused to accept, and where, long after the 
accidPnt the carrier's truck and settle-
claim by another insurer, the agent 
the which it paid, there 
was no basis under such 
Id.-Contract--Formation.-There is no insurance contract 
or unknown event to be insured against 
insured and insurer when the premium 
was §§ 22, 250.) 
!d.-Contract--Certificate of Insurer as Contract.-Noticc 
filed by an insurer vdth the state Public Utilities Commission 
that it had insured a carrier for the period in ques-
ereating a contract of insurance 
of the public was in-
T nsurancc, 
McK. Dig, References: ~~ HO, fllSUI'Hfle(', 
§ 37; flSlll""fi<'P § 333. 
90 [47 C.2d 
was liable because 
two were to pay any loss over and 
above that covered other and where a judgment 
the insurer found liable must reversed for insuffi-
of the evidence to show that it had insured plaintiff 
and alone the basis for the judgment exonerating 
the other insurers and the retrial would 
be which of those two the whole loss or some 
the in their favor 
must be reversPd was taken therefrom. 
APPEAL from a of the Court of the 
City and County of San F'raneisco. Thomas M. Foley, Judge. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Action by highway carrier against two public liability in-
surers in which defendants filed cross-complaints against two 
other insurers. Judgment for cross-defendant Royal In-
demnity Company affirmed; remaining portion of judgment 
for plaintiff against one liability insurer and in favor of other 
insurer and other cross-defendant, reversed. 
Foley, Branson & Limpert and Francis N. Foley for Ap-
pellant. 
Edward A. Friend for Plaintiff and Respondent and for 
Cross-defendant and Respondent St. Paul Mercury Indemnity 
Co. 
Millington & Dell 'Ergo, Wayne R. Millington and Robert 
J. Dell 'Ergo for Cross-complainant and Respondent. 
Keith, Creede & Sedgwick and Frank J. Creede for Cross-
defendant and Respondent Royal Indemnity Co. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff, a highway common carrier, com-
menced an aetion alleging that one of his trucks was involved 
in an accident on June 5, 1951, in which two persons named 
Kuhwarth were killed; that at that time there were in effect, 
e.overing his truck, policies of public liability insurance issued 
by Northwest Casualty Company, Nonvieh Union Fire In-
suranee Society, Ltd. and St. Paul Mereury Indemnity Com-
pany; that the Kuhwarths' representatives eommcnced aetions 
against him >rhieh he settled by paying a total of $6,600; that 
St. Paul i~-; willing to pay one-third of 1he amount. Only 
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were answered; 
was also answered. The issues as presented 
the of which of: the four insurance companies 
was liable for the settlement with Kuhwarths' representatives 
what portion each should bear. It is conceded that Royal 
had no policy covering plaintiff; judgment was 
in its favor, and no contention is made here for reversal. 
The court rendered judgment concluding that plaintiff 
was insured with Norwich and it must pay all of the settle-
ment because, although plaintiff also had insurance with 
Northwest and St. Paul, those policies had "other insurance" 
provisions under which they were not liable except to the 
extent that the claim exceeded the coverage offered by the 
Norwich policy which contained no such "other insurance" 
clause. Judgment was accordingly entered that plaintiff re-
cover the $6,600 from Norwich and for St. Paul against 
Northwest and Norwich for costs; that Northwest recover its 
costs of "defending the Complaint." Norwich, alone, ap-
peals from the judgment, asserting the evidence is insufficient 
to support the judgment that it had an insurance contract 
with plaintiff and in any case plaintiff had no interest in the 
controversy because St. Paul rather tl1an plaintiff had paid 
the $6,600 Kuhwarth settlement. 
It is undisputed that the Kuhwarth settlement was fair 
and reasonable. St. Paul alone defended plaintiff in the 
actions and negotiated the settlement. The policy of each of 
the three insurers, Norwich, Northwest and St. Paul, is in an 
amount more than sufficient to pay the settlement. The court 
found that all three insurance companies were notified of the 
Kuhwarth accident. ·when the Kuhwarth settlement was 
made, St. Paul paid plaintiff the amount thereof and plain-
tiff obtained a cashier's check for the balance which was paid 
to the Kuhwarths' representatives, and a loan agreement was 
made between St. Paul and plaintiff under which plaintiff 
was to pay the $6,600 if and when he recovered it from the 
other alleged insurers. 
NorwiCh asserts that there was no evidence that there was 
an insurance contract between it and plaintiff because the 
policy was not delivered to plaintiff nor accepted by him; that 
there was no meeting of minds. Plaintiff testified that at the 
92 
an agent other than 
of the accident to any 
whom he handed the papers 
actions. 
The uncontradicted 
manager of Williams Insurance Is 
in harmony with plaintiff's and shows that vYilliams 
had been handling automobile insurance and had 
placed a Northwest policy for him which 
1951; that although were told 
1st that he was placing his insurance 
no request for insurance from 
and Northwest policies 
ness. When the Norwich 
deliver it to plaintiff and to his bank which held 
his equipment but both refused the 
he had obtained insurance elsewhere; 
deliver the policy returned 
Plaintiff does not th]s 
tention to the following facts in the 
Iiams' request Norwich issued, that 
to plaintiff to run from June 1, to June 1, 
sent it to vVilliams; it also filed a notice with the state Public 
Utilities Commission that as the Public Utilities 
Code, it had insured plaintiff for the question. 
Norwich cancelled the policy in June after the and 
on June 7, 1951, so advised the Public Utilities Commission, 
to be effective on June 26, 1951. On vYilliams 
sent a bill to plaintiff on a Norwich form for premium for 
the policy from ,June 1, 1951 to ,June and plaintiff 
paid the bill. 
[1] Accepting this undisputed there is no basiP 
for liability under the Norwich where was 
paid long after the loss (the accident) and St. Paul was nego-
tiating a settlement of the claim arising out of the accident. 
It is said in Hargett v. Gulf Ins. Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 449, 457 
company, but the 
it was issued 
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which fact does 
had already 
upon the doctrine 
this com-
after the de-
insurance." It is said in Commercial 
Cas. 22 Tenn.App. 656 [125 
"It appears that a policy covering this 
the Columbia Casualty Insurance 
evidence unsatisfactory as to whether 
the accident or afterwards. But whether 
a was is not material in this case, as the 
evidence is uncontroverted that Carter did not apply for the 
had its never accepted it; 
the Commercial Casualty Insurance 
had not cancelled; and that he 
the issuance of the policy in the Columbia 
the accident. There was, therefore, 
Carter and the Columbia Casualty Com-
was issued dated September 26, 1928. 
of insurance is purely a personal contract 
between the insured and the insurance company. 32 C.J. 
14 H.C.h § 535; John Weis, Inc. v. Notie 
90 S.W.2d 677, 6821 ; Hackney Co. 
421. 
fire policy from one 
a substitute for 
completed con-
where sueh assent 
94 NoRTHWEST CASUALTY Co. 
not bound. Waterloo Lttmber Co. 
158 Iowa 138 N.W. 504, 51 In 
Byrne v. Prudential Ins. Co. (Mo.) 88 S.W.2d 
344, the court said: "While a contract of insurance 'has 
some features which distinguish it from an ordinary com-
mercial contract, in it is like any other 
contract and is governed the same rules.' 32 C.J. p. 1091. 
It is as essential to the of a contract of insurance 
as it is to any other contract that there be 'an agreement, or 
meeting of the minds of the thereto. 32 c .. J. p. 1095. 
Here the action is based upon an alleged contract between 
Schockley and the defendant insurance company. The appli-
cation is a request or proposal for insurance and also sup-
plies the insurance company with the information necessary to 
enable it to pass upon the application. An acceptance by the 
company and the issuance and delivery of its policy of in-
surance in reliance upon and in conformity with the appli-
cation completes the contract. Admittedly Schockley did 
not make out or sign the application, was not present at the 
time, nor was it shown that he ever consented to the issuance 
of the policy of insurance on his life and in his name or had 
knowledge thereof. Absent any evidence tending to show 
that either before or at the time he consented to the taking 
of the insurance in his name or subsequent to the making of 
the application or issuance of the policy had knowledge thereof 
and either specifically or impliedly ratified same it seems to 
follow, in such situation, as a matter of law, that no contract 
was entered into or existed between Schockley and the in-
surance company." (See Hicks v. Hicklin, 187 S.C. 355 [197 
S.E. 390] ; Hicklin v. State Farm Mnt. Automobile Ins. Co., 
176 S.C. 504 [180 S.E. 666]; Mallard v. Hardwa1·e Indem. 
Ins. Co., (Tex.Civ.App.) 216 S.W.2d 263.) [2] Clearly, 
under plaintiff's theory there would not be an insurance con-
tract, under the facts here presented, because the contingency 
was known to both plaintiff and Norwich when the premium 
was paid. ''Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes 
to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising 
from a contingent or unknown event." (Ins. Code, § 22.) 
"Except as provided in this article any contingent or un-
known event, whether past or future, which may damnify a 
person having an insurable interest, or create a liability 
against him, may be insured against, subject to the provisions 
of this code." (I d., § 250.) 'rhe exceptions refer to lotteries, 
gaming and wagering (id., §§ 251-252). [3] The notice to 
VvN v. NoRTHWEST CASUALTY Co. 
f 47 C.2d 89; 301 P.2d 869] 
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Utilities Commission did not have the effect of 
a contract of insurance between the here in-
we are not concerned with a member of the public. 
Heference is made to a letter written by counsel for Nor-
on June 1952. That is of no for even though 
stated that notice was to the Public Utilities Com-
Norwich, it also stated that Norwich had issued 
to but it was "collaborating" with St. 
which was plaintiil''s insurer 
Cases such as Hill v. Industrial Ace. Com., 10 Cal.App.2d 
178 [51 P.2d 1126), cited by plaintiff concerning the effect 
of the sending of a policy by the company to its agent and 
the payment of premium did not involve a situation such 
as we have here where plaintiff never ordered any insurance, 
informed the insurance agent he did not want any insurance 
and the payment of premium was made long after the loss and 
another insurer was actively handling the case for the insured. 
[4] Inasmuch as the judgment against Norwich must be 
reversed for insufficiency of the evidence to show that it had 
insured plaintiff and only Norwich appeals, the question arises 
as to the disposition or effect on the remainder of the judg-
ment. As heretofore stated the court found that plaintiff 
was insured by Norwich, Nor·thwest and St. Paul but that only 
Norwich was liable because the policies of Northwest and St. 
Paul were to pay any loss over and above that covered by 
other insurance.1 Since by reason of the reversal as to Nor-
wich there is not other insurance insofar as Norwich would 
be the other insurance carrier, the basis for the judgment 
exonerating Northwest and St. Paul falls. This would mean 
that the question on retrial would be, which was liable of 
those two for the whole loss or some portion thereo£.2 It 
must therefore follow that the portion of the judgment in 
favor of Northwest and St. Paul will have to be reversed 
even though plaintiff did not appeal, because the legal basis 
for such judgment is gone by the reversal. The judgment 
as to them on that basis is so interwoven and dependent on 
1N orthwest 's policy says if there is other valid insurance the policy 
shall be void, except to the extent the limits of the policy are in excess 
of the limits in the other insurance in which case the excess is covered. 
St. Paul's policy says no insuring agreement thereof shall apply to any 
loss if the insured has other insurance except as respects any excess 
beyond the amount which would have been payable under the other 
insurance. 
2This is assuming that no better case could be made than has been 
made to show plaintiff was insured with Norwich. 
Hence a reYersal, which nrcessary, 
to St. Paul's and Nortlnvcst 's 
finding above mentioned that carried insurance for 
tiff. Thus it follows that the who1c matter is thrown open to 
reascertainment on retrial. 
It may be mentioned that the evidence is m-
sufficient to show that Northwest insured plaintiff because 
it is substantially the same as that with to Norwich 
but that is a matter which may be determined on retrial. It 
is unnecessary to consider Norwich's that plaintiff 
does not have a standing to sue because of its claim that he 
was paid by St. Paul and the "loan" whereby 
plaintiff agreed to repay the settlement to St. Paul 
if it recovered from the other a true loan. 
Since the judgment must be reversed the matter is one sub-
ject for determination on a retrial, and in this connection it 
should be observed that aJl the parties are before the court 
for a determination of the amount if any to he horne by each 
insurer. (See Fidelity etc. Co. v. Fit·eman's F. I. Co., 38 
Cal.App.2d 1 [100 P.2c1 364]; diseussion and cases colleeted, 
5 Stan.L.Rev. 147.) 
The judgment in favor of the 
affirmed. The 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., 
J., and McComb, .T., coneurred. 
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